Group Perspective: Interest Grouping and Bargaining

Understanding Policies (10700193-90)

Yue Hu

Tsinghua University

Overview

  • Group theory
    • Core concepts
    • Evolution
  • Collective action problem
    • Fundamental logic
    • Solutions of the collective action problem
    • Beyond collective action

Group Theory

Definition of public policy (⁉️)

The most general one:

Attitude and actions regarding a public objective.

Actor based → RT

Whatever governments choose to do or not to do (Dye 1972, 2)

Institution based → ST

The principles that govern action directed towards given ends (Titmuss 1975, 23).

Outcome based → GT

A set of actions that affect the solution of a policy problem, i.e. a dissatisfaction regarding a certain need, demand or opportunity for public intervention (Dente 2014).

A perspective of group theory

Policy making as a continual struggle for balancing among the competing interests of various groups.

James Madison Arthur Bentley David Truman Mancur Olson Elinor Ostrom

Crux of Group Theory

Who’re the group, and why grouping?

Remember how elites become elites?

Starting from Elitism

What’s the opposite of elitism: Populism or Pluralism?

Elitism & Populism

Elitism & Populism

A set of elites.

Pluralism

Pluralism

Interest groups

Pluralism

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community (Madison 1787).

Group = “faction” = Interest group

Group = “faction” = Interest group

How does it work?

How do Interest Groups Make Politics (Bentley 1908)

Arthur Bentley

Arthur Bentley
  • Activity of a group
  • Expression of an interest
  • Exertion of pressure

Where to put government (Truman 1951)

Interest Groups’ internal characteristics

  • Degree of organization
  • Skills of the leadership
  • Resources/money

Governmental Institutions

  • Operating structure
  • Groups’ effects on particular branches of the government

Government Process

  • Government institutions: Politicized interest groups.
  • Interest groups’ characteristics influence governmental decisions.
  • Diversity makes policy-making flexible.

Interest groups: Control vs. Prevent?

Control

“Only working in a republic” — Madison

Why:

  • A large one (diverse interest groups)
  • Under federalism (making local matter)

“Anti-pure-democracy”

Madison: Only the representatives can construct common interests.

Prevent ✓

How to Prevent

严肃党内政治生活贵在经常、重在认真、要在细节。党中央权威,全党都必须自觉维护,并具体体现到自己的全部工作中去,决不能表面上喊着同党中央保持一致、实际上没当回事,更不能违背中央大政方针各自为政、自行其是。党内组织和组织、组织和个人、同志和同志、集体领导和个人分工负责等重要关系都要按照民主集中制原则来设定和处理,不能缺位错位、本末倒置。党内政治生活和组织生活都要讲政治、讲原则、讲规矩,不能搞假大空,不能随意化、平淡化,更不能娱乐化、庸俗化。党内上下关系、人际关系、工作氛围都要突出团结和谐、纯洁健康、弘扬正气,不允许搞团团伙伙、帮帮派派,不允许搞利益集团、进行利益交换 (习近平 2014)。

Modeling Group Action

Mancur Olson: Understand “free rider” problem with economic means

Mancur Olson: Understand “free rider” problem with economic means

Elinor Ostrom: Institutional arrangement for collective actions

Elinor Ostrom: Institutional arrangement for collective actions

Taking-Home Points

  • Group theory
    • Grouping who and why group
    • Evolution: Madison → Bentley → Truman
      • Pluralism
      • Interest group
      • Government’s role
      • Anti-interest group
  • Modeling group actions
    • Olson: the collective action problem
    • Ostrom: bring the institution in

Reference

Bentley, Arthur Fisher. 1908. The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures. Principia Press.
Dente, Bruno. 2014. “Understanding Policy Decisions.” In Understanding Policy Decisions, 1–27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02520-9_1.
Dye, Thomas R. 1972. Understanding Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
Madison, James. 1787. “The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection from the New York Packet.” In The Federalist Papers. 10. New York.
Oliver, Pamela E., and Gerald Marwell. 1988. “The Paradox of Group Size in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II.” American Sociological Review 53 (1, 1): 1–8. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095728.
Olson, Mancur. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press.
Titmuss, Richard Morris. 1975. Social Policy : An Introduction. New York : Pantheon Books.
Truman, David B. 1951. The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion. New York: Knopf.
习近平. 2014. “在党的群众路线教育实践活动总结大会上的讲话.” 新华社.

Bonus: Collective Action

Goods

Examples in the real world

private good

private good

club good

club good

common good (rivalry is high)

common good (rivalry is high)

public good

public good

Collective Action Problem: Supply of Public Goods

Every rational actors has an intention not to contribute (Olson 1971). why?

Every rational actors has an intention not to contribute (Olson 1971). why?

Real-life Example: Brexit

Olson’s Solutions: Small size

Olson’s Solutions: In-Out Group Difference

Olson’s Solutions: Selective Incentives

Olson’s Solutions: Coercion

An Institutionalist Solution

Institutional arrangement for collective actions (Ostrom 1990)

  • People are not autonomous
  • Rules can reduce collective action issues

Collective action not a problem

Critical Mass Theory (Oliver and Marwell 1988)

Production functions determine the critical mass

  • Accelerating (bandwagon effects)
  • Decelerating (free-rider)

S-shape

S-shape

Network & Cooperation

Social capital: Credibility solves the collective action

Cooperation:

  • Activists: Seeking for central positions and more connections
  • Resource users: Embedding in smaller, denser networks.